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“Virtues are acquired, stable dispositions to engage in certain characteristic
modes of behavior that are conducive to human flourishing.”1 Virtues only have
meaning in the context of human behavior.2 In the context of a legal system,
there are a host of virtues that must be balanced and weighed amongst each
other.3 However, “the primary virtue of law is its ability to achieve the purposes
for which it is intended: to protect people, provide services, and achieve
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1. Eduardo M. Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 864 (2009) (citations
omitted).
2. Matthew Bruckner, The Virtue of Bankruptcy, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 233, 253 (2013).
3. See, e.g., Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and
Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 289,
304, 314 (2012) (recognizing that there are competing virtues and values in a legal system).
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justice.”4 If a legal system fails at achieving its primary purposes, the legal
system is failing society.
In the context of the U.S. consumer bankruptcy legal system, the primary
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code5 are to provide a “fresh start” to individuals6
and to provide an equitable distribution to creditors.7 These primary purposes
are a reflection of core virtues in society—hope and fairness. The fresh start
provides hope to individuals, and the equitable distribution provides fairness to
creditors. 8 This paper argues that the current consumer bankruptcy system,
particularly with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Protection
Act of 2005 (“Reform Act”),9 is not promoting these core virtues. Thus, this
paper also argues that the system is not promoting the primary virtue of any legal
system, that is achieving “the purposes for which it is intended: to protect people,
provide services, and achieve justice.”10
This Article provides an overview of the historical development of consumer
bankruptcy in the United States by exploring the core virtues of Chapter 7 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In light of the Reform Act, this Article then examines
its impact on the core virtues of Chapter 7. Based on this analysis, conclusions,
and areas of future research are considered.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Prior to analyzing the current purposes and virtues of consumer bankruptcy
law in the United States, it is necessary to provide a brief historical perspective
on the development of consumer bankruptcy law. Some scholars have analyzed
the historical development in three periods: 1898 through the 1930s, the 1930s
through 1978, and 1978 through the present.11 That framework was adequate
4. Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and What They Tell Us About
Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 MICH. L. REV. 863, 881 (2011).
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1527 (2012). Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Bankruptcy
Code, Code, or Section are to Title 11 of the United States Code.
6. In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 378 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing the “fresh
start” purpose of bankruptcy); Patel v. Shamrock Floor Covering Serv., Inc., 565 F.3d 963, 967
(6th Cir. 2009) (noting a central purpose of bankruptcy is to provide a “fresh start” to debtors); see
also Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-Enacted Bankruptcy Exemption
Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 354 (2014)
(“[T]he most notable consequence of the consumer bankruptcy system remains the availability of
the fresh start for a financially beleaguered individual . . . .”).
7. In re Kestell, 99 F.3d 146, 149–50 (4th Cir. 1996) (“A major purpose of the bankruptcy
process is the equitable distribution of a bankrupt’s assets among creditors.”).
8. One court has recognized the dual purposes of bankruptcy in this way: “Bankruptcy is
both a creditor’s remedy and a debtor’s right.” Patel, 565 F.3d at 967.
9. See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified in various sections of 11 U.S.C.).
10. Rubin, supra note 4, at 881.
11. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 3–5 (2001) (recounting the history of bankruptcy laws beginning with the gold standard,
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until the enactment of the Reform Act in 2005.12 In light of the Reform Act, a
fourth era has emerged: The Post-Reform Act Era.13 This article provides an
overview of the first three eras and builds upon the prior historical treatment by
adding the Post-Reform Act Era.
A. Period One: 1898 – 1930s
Although there were intermittent periods in the United States with bankruptcy
laws prior to 1898, 14 it was not until 1898 that bankruptcy law became a
permanent fixture. 15 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (“1898 Act”) 16 stayed in
effect for eighty years, with many amendments over time.17 The 1898 Act had
provisions for voluntary bankruptcy for any person owing debts. 18 Trustees
were empowered to avoid fraudulent and preferential transfers for the benefit of
the estate.19 Importantly, too, beyond liquidation provisions, compositions with
the approval of a majority of creditors were included so that upon court

to the Great Depression, and through the New Deal reforms); see also Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating
Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174, 181–84 (2012) (highlighting and summarizing the major
periods of bankruptcy law in the United States); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy
Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 5–44 (1995) (providing a very
comprehensive treatment of bankruptcy history in the United States).
12. See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
13. See Bruce M. Price & Terry Dalton, From Downhill to Slalom: An Empirical Analysis of
the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (and Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
135, 136–37 (2007) (addressing the reforms imposed by the Reform Act of 2005, including stricter
means regarding consumer debtors and curtailing abuse).
14. Bankruptcy law during the early nineteenth century took a pattern of bust and boom, with
legislation arising in economic downturns and legislation being repealed during boom periods. See
SKEEL, supra note 11, at 23; Bruce, supra note 11, at 183 (discussing the pattern of bankruptcy
legislation after economic downturns and the repeal of legislation during better economic periods);
see also Bethany A. Corbin, Losing at Dodge Ball: Understanding the Supreme Court’s Implied
Authorization of Consent in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison and Why Revision of
28 U.S.C. 157(b) is Critical for Clarity, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 109, 116–17 (2015) (discussing early
bankruptcy legislation in the nineteenth century and how it was responsive to economic downturns
immediately following the Civil War); Albert Togut & Samantha J. Rothman, Chapter 11: Out of
Balance, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2014, at 87 (noting the bust and boom pattern of bankruptcy
legislation).
15. SKEEL, supra note 11, at 4–5; Bruce, supra note 11, at 182–83 (noting that the 1898 Act
was the beginning of a period in which the United States had permanent bankruptcy legislation);
Ponoroff, supra note 6, at 355 (noting that the 1898 legislation was the “first long-standing federal
bankruptcy law”).
16. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 548, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
17. See Tabb, supra note 11, at 23, 26–27 (discussing several amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 including the amendment of 1926 and the Chandler Act in 1938).
18. Id. at 26.
19. Id.
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confirmation of the composition, there would be a distribution of the assets and
the case would be dismissed.20
B. Period Two: 1930s – 1978
The Great Depression ushered in a new era of bankruptcy law, 21 which
brought about reforms to bankruptcy that were debtor-oriented.22 After several
years of bankruptcy legislation, the Chandler Act23 was passed in 1938.24 The
Chandler Act made significant changes to many different aspects of bankruptcy
law in the areas of liquidation and reorganization. 25 But perhaps the most
notable change was to Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, addressing wage
earners’ plans.26 The Chandler Act, although modified with some legislation
periodically,27 was the foundation for bankruptcy law in the United States for
forty years.28
C. Period Three: 1979 – 2005
The passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (“1978 Act”)29 brought
about the modern era of bankruptcy law under the Code, some calling it a
“revitalization of bankruptcy practice” in the United States.30 The 1978 Act was
not a response to an economic downturn,31 but rather the result of Congress’
concern over the rising number of consumer bankruptcy filings, making
substantial changes to the process of individual bankruptcies.32 The 1978 Act
was “a fairly even balance” between debtor and creditor interests.33 It sought to
encourage greater use of Chapter 13 by providing greater discharge relief than a
filing under Chapter 7. 34 As such, much of the 1978 Act was designed to
enhance administration of bankruptcy filings.35
20. Id.
21. SKEEL, supra note 11, at 5.
22. Bruce, supra note 11, at 183; see also Tabb, supra note 11, at 28–29.
23. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
24. Bruce, supra note 11, at 183.
25. Tabb, supra note 11, at 29–30.
26. Bruce, supra note 11, at 183.
27. Id. at 183–84.
28. Tabb, supra note 11, at 30–31.
29. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified in
various sections of 11 U.S.C.).
30. SKEEL, supra note 11, at 5.
31. Tabb, supra note 11, at 32.
32. Bruce, supra note 11, at 184.
33. Tabb, supra note 11, at 36.
34. Id. at 35–36.
35. Id. at 35 (explaining that the Commission established the “United States Trustees
Program” to relieve bankruptcy judges from overburdening administrative duties, among other
reforms).
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Several amendments were made to the 1978 Act until Congress passed the
Reform Act in 2005.36 The most important change from a consumer Chapter 7
perspective was the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”).37 The 1984 Act added subsection (b) to
section 707 of the Code.38 Section 707(b) provided for dismissal of a consumer
case for “substantial abuse,” but it expressly provided a presumption in favor of
debtors.39 Section 707(b) remained intact without any major changes until the
Reform Act.40
Substantial abuse was added to the Code out of the perceived increase in
situations where consumers who could repay some debtors avoided making
these payments by obtaining a discharge under Chapter 7. 41 Therefore,
substantial abuse was a tool to address the perceived problem of increasing
consumer filings.42 However, it was unclear how effective of a tool it was, as a
body of case law with various standards developed in an attempt to apply the
substantial abuse standard.43
In effect, this period saw a dramatic increase in consumer filings. 44 This
increase in filings is important because it fueled the legislative effort that began
36. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
37. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 312,
98 Stat. 333, 355 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2012)). The section originally provided:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and not at the request or
suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under
this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief
would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a
presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.
Id.; see also Wayne R. Wells, Janell M. Kurtz & Robert J. Calhoun, The Implementation of
Bankruptcy Code Section 707(b): The Law and the Reality, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 15, 15 (1991)
(“This section allows the bankruptcy court to act either sua sponte or on the motion of the United
States Trustee to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse when the case is filed by an
individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts.”).
38. Wells, Kurtz & Calhoun, supra note 37, at 17.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. II 1982).
40. A couple of changes are worth noting, but neither of them fundamentally modified the
substantial abuse analysis. First, the United States Trustee was given standing to bring such
motions in 1986. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 219, 100 Stat. 3088, 3101. Prior to 1986 only courts could
prosecute such motions. David G. Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of
2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 238 (2007). Second, in 1997 post-petition tithing was
expressly protected in the context of a substantial abuse analysis. See Religious Liberty and
Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517, 518.
41. See Lauren E. Tribble, Note, Judicial Discretion and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
Act, 57 DUKE L.J. 789, 795–96 (2007) (explaining that before 1984, debtors were allowed to
eliminate their debts under Chapter 7 as long as they were honest with the Court).
42. Wells, Kurtz & Calhoun, supra note 37, at 17 (noting that consumer filings doubled from
1978 to 1982, which fueled the lobbying effort by the credit industry).
43. Tribble, supra note 41, at 796.
44. See Tabb, supra note 11, at 37 n.266 (citing over forty bankruptcy laws that have been
enacted since the 1978 Act in the hopes of curtailing the increased consumer filings).
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the Post-Reform Act Era, which is discussed later in this Article.45 Figure 1 sets
forth the total bankruptcy filings from 1980 to 2014 and reflects the great portion
of filings that are consumer-oriented.

46

Most of the consumer filings since the enactment of the Code were filed under
Chapter 7. 47 On average, nearly 70% of all consumer cases are filed under
Chapter 7.48 It is important to note that in most Chapter 7 cases there is no return
to creditors, as they are no-asset cases.49 The characterization of Chapter 7 as a
liquidation chapter is essentially a misnomer.
D. The Post-Reform Act Era: 2005 – Present
The Code remained largely unchanged from 197850 until the passage of the
Reform Act in April 2005, 51 which is considered the beginning of the Post45. See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
46. This table is derived from a data set compiled by the author based on data published by
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See Caseload Statistics Data Tables,
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/
caseload-statistics-data-tables?tn=&pn=32&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%5B
value%5D%5Byear%5D= (last visited July 20, 2016). The author’s data set compilation is on file
and available upon request.
47. Price & Dalton, supra note 13, at 142–43.
48. Id.
49. Ed Flynn, Chapter 7 Asset Cases and Trustee Compensation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June
2014, at 48–49 (noting that in most states the amount of cases that are asset cases is below 5%).
50. There were several amendments to the Code impacting consumer bankruptcy, but none
of the post-1978 legislation modified the basic policy underpinnings of the Code. For an overview
of this legislation, see Tabb, supra note 11, at 40–43.
51. Bruce, supra note 11, at 189. Although the passage of the Reform Act was April 20,
2005, the effective date was October 17, 2005. Price & Dalton, supra note 13, at 136.
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Reform Act Era. The Reform Act was the most significant reform to the Code
since 1978.52 The Reform Act was designed to curb the perceived abuse of
individuals seeking relief under Chapter 753 by contracting “the circumstances
under which relief may be sought, and by whom.”54 The purpose was to shift
individuals from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 relief.55
The primary mechanism to achieve this purpose is the implementation of a
statutory means test56 that is applicable to individual consumer debtors,57 unless
they’re specifically excluded from the application of the means test. 58 The
means test calculates a debtor’s income and expenses under a complex
formula.59 Under the means test, if a debtor’s income is above the applicable
state median income,60 and after accounting for expenses (both actual expenses61
and those based on IRS standards)62 the debtor has disposable income63 above
certain mathematical thresholds,64 granting relief is presumed to be an abuse of
Chapter 7. 65 The presumption of abuse can be rebutted in very limited
circumstances. 66 If the presumption is not rebutted, the case is due to be
dismissed, unless the debtor voluntary converts to Chapter 13.67

52. Bruce, supra note 11, at 189; Price & Dalton, supra note 13, at 136.
53. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 11, at 189 (noting the Congressional intent was to deter abuse
of the bankruptcy process); Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Bankruptcy Fee Study: Final Report,
20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 17, 27 (2012) (“Another declared purpose of the Act was to stop the
perceived abuse of the bankruptcy system by consumer debtors who could pay their debts but
instead opted to file for bankruptcy protection.”).
54. Ponoroff, supra note 6, at 354.
55. Price & Dalton, supra note 13, at 137–38.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012). For a concise overview of the means test, see Linda E. Coco,
Swords, Shields, and Shackles: Human and Corporate “Persons” Under the Bankruptcy Abuse
Preventions and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 83 MISS. L.J. 293, 308–12 (2014).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1).
58. Id. at § 707(b)(2)(D) (noting an example of an exempt group such as disabled veterans).
59. Lupica, supra note 53, at 33.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(A) (setting forth the requirement that if the debtor’s income
exceeds the applicable median income, the means test calculation is required).
61. Id. at § 707(b)(2)(A) (permitting deductions for actual expenses for certain items if
documented).
62. Certain expenses in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) are derived from national and local IRS standards.
See Schultz v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining the process of
deductions based on national IRS standards).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (detailing calculations used to arrive at what is effectively
disposable income to fund a repayment plan).
64. See Schultz, 529 F.3d at 347.
65. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(1), 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), 707(b)(7) (providing the statutory
framework for finding a presumption of abuse); see also Schultz, 529 F.3d at 347 (noting that
passage of the Reform Act’s means test is required to avoid the presumption of abuse).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
67. Id. at § 707(b)(2); see also Price & Dalton, supra note 13, at 136–37 (“From a consumer
perspective, the most dramatic change is that debtors who have incomes above their state’s median

700

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 65:693

The Reform Act also mandates other specific hurdles for consumer debtors.68
For example, credit counseling is mandated as a prerequisite to qualify for
relief.69 These courses typically cost about fifty dollars.70 The credit counseling
is a misnomer, as in most cases there is no direct credit counseling with
prospective debtors, but rather it is conducted via the internet or via telephone.71
This requirement simply adds costs and is an artificial hurdle to obtaining relief
without any clear benefit.72 Without completing credit counseling prior to filing,
most cases will be dismissed.73
Another procedural hurdle to obtaining a discharge is the completion of a
personal financial management course by debtors prior to entry of a discharge.74
Upon completion of the course, a debtor must file a certificate showing
completion of the course.75 A debtor will typically be denied a discharge if he
or she does not complete the course and the case will be administratively
closed.76 The exceptions in which a debtor can obtain a discharge despite not
completing the course are limited.77 One broad exception applies to situations
where the U.S. Trustee has determined that the waiver of the course is
necessary.78 The other exception applies if a debtor can show that he or she was
unable to complete the course because of incapacity, disability, or active military
duty in a combat zone.79 These grounds for an exception are exclusive.80 In
practice, therefore, obtaining a waiver is quite difficult and case-specific.81

and who fail a ‘means test’ are presumed to be abusing the system. If they wish to file a Chapter 7
liquidation, they instead are channeled into filing Chapter 13 plans.”).
68. Lupica, supra note 53, at 33–34 (noting several new requirements for consumer debtors,
such as counseling and educational courses, and specific income and expense standards).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1).
70. Wendy Tien, New Rules for Credit Counseling and Debtor Education, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., June 2013, at 34 (2013).
71. Id. at 80 (describing the internet as the dominant form of counseling).
72. Id. at 81 (noting that the USTP has questioned the quality and duration of the credit
counseling).
73. Eric Pitter, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Credit Scoring Implications of the
Amended Bankruptcy Code—and How Bankruptcy Lawyers can Help, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 61, 63 (2007) (recognizing the increased number of dismissals based on the failure to obtain
credit counseling).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11).
75. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(7).
76. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(1)(H).
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11).
78. Id.
79. Id. at § 109(h)(4).
80. See In re Denger, 417 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009).
81. For example, incarceration has not always been found to meet the exemption
requirements. See, e.g., In re Vollmer, 361 B.R. 811, 814–15 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (describing
a case where an incarcerated debtor was unable to prove his situation qualified as exempt until it
was eventually granted upon review).
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Beyond the statutory means test and other substantive provisions added by the
Reform Act that are applicable to consumer debtors, the Reform Act’s most
significant change is the shift in consumer bankruptcy policy from a
presumption in favor of granting relief82 to the application of the means test to
determine if there is a presumption of abuse.83 This is a shift in fundamental
bankruptcy policy in the United States.84
II. COMPETING PURPOSES OF CHAPTER 7 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
There are two, well entrenched, primary competing purposes of Chapter 7
consumer bankruptcy in the United States:85 (1) a fresh start for individuals86
and (2) an equitable distribution of assets among creditors.87 The fresh start for

82. Under the previous language of section 707(b), the standard warranting dismissal was a
finding of “substantial abuse”, and there was a presumption in favor of granting relief. See 11
U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). Under section 707(b), as amended by the Reform Act, the standard was
lowered to just “abuse” rather than “substantial abuse”, and the presumption in favor of the debtor
was removed. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012); see also Coco, supra note 56, at 307 n.71.
83. See Coco, supra note 56, at 307–08 (recognizing the significance of the shift in the
underlying presumption).
84. See e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 375–76 (2007) (“Congress enacted amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
that—if effective—would fundamentally change the core polices underlying the consumer
bankruptcy system in this country.”). These changes to U.S. bankruptcy policy “radically altered
the policies underlying consumer bankruptcy in this country, marking a significant shift in favor of
creditors.” Id.; see also Henry E. Hildebrand, III, Impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on Chapter 13 Trustees, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373, 373 n.3 (2005)
(noting that BAPCPA represented a shift in public policy from making “bankruptcy a more
effective remedy for the unfortunate consumer debtor,” to “restoring personal responsibility and
integrity to the bankruptcy system”).
85. See Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Abandonments in Bankruptcy: Unifying Competing Tax and
Bankruptcy Policies, 88 MINN. L. REV. 723, 753 (2004) (“The twin policies underlying the
bankruptcy system are to ensure fair and equitable distribution to all creditors . . . and to preserve
the debtor’s fresh start after bankruptcy.”); see also Elijah M. Alper, Note, Opportunistic Informal
Bankruptcy: How BAPCPA May Fail to Make Wealthy Debtors Pay Up, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1908,
1913 (2007) (recognizing the competing interests of bankruptcy law to provide a “fresh start” and
to acknowledge the obligation to pay debts).
86. See Ashley Koenen, Comment, Schwab v. Reilly: No Objection Required, 23 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 358, 369 (2011) (“In accordance with the Bankruptcy Code’s purpose, Chapter
7 bankruptcies are rooted in the interest of giving debtors a ‘fresh start’.”); see also Marrama v.
Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (recognizing that the principal purpose of the
Code is to provide honest debtors a “fresh start”).
87. See Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915) (“It is the purpose
of the Bankrupt Act to convert the assets of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors,
and then to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him
to start a fresh . . . . ”); see also Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Bankruptcy Reform: What’s Tax Got to do
With it? 71 MO. L. REV. 879, 882 (2006) (“[T]he dual policy justifications upon which the system
is built: providing a fresh start to deserving debtors while furnishing a fair and equitable distribution
to creditors.”).
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individuals is provided by the discharge 88 of debt. 89 The discharge is often
viewed “as being synonymous with the fresh start.”90 The discharge of most
pre-petition debt91 relieves the burden of debt to allow individuals to emerge
from bankruptcy as productive members of society.92 Although some debts may
be excluded from discharge,93 courts construe the exception to dischargeability
strictly so as to preserve bankruptcy law’s “purpose of giving debtors a fresh
start.”94
Two other statutory provisions in the Code also promote the fresh start. Prior
to entry of a discharge in a case, the automatic stay95 of all collection efforts
helps facilitate the fresh start principle by providing the debtor a breathing
spell.96 Beyond giving a fresh start to debtors, it also protects assets of the estate
and permits the bankruptcy court to resolve disputes regarding property of the
estate, thus potentially making distributions to creditors equitable. 97 The
automatic stay is so important that its violators are subject to contempt
proceedings or incur damages.98
The fresh start is also promoted by the ability of an individual debtor to retain
exempt assets99 after bankruptcy.100 Under either state or federal law, exempt
88. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012) (providing the parameters for granting a discharge).
89. The Supreme Court has recognized that the discharge works toward the end of a fresh
start for Chapter 7 debtors. See Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367.
90. Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 74 (2006); see also Koenen, supra note 86, at 370 (“The discharge, in effect,
serves as the debtor’s ‘fresh start’.”); Michael D. Sousa, A Circuits Split: Does the Bankruptcy
Code Implicitly Repeal the FDCPA?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2006, at 59 (noting that the
discharge of personal liability for pre-petition debt is known as “the proverbial ‘fresh start’”); W.
Brian Memory, Comment, Vicarious Nondischargeability for Fraudulent Debts: Understanding
the Dual Purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A), 20 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 633, 633 (2004) (recognizing that
the discharge effectuates a fresh start which is “entrenched in our bankruptcy laws”).
91. Most unsecured debts are discharged under the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
92. Rafael Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 141, 141
(1998).
93. Some debts, such as student loans, certain taxes, and domestic/support obligations, are
exempted from discharge. See Lars Lefgren & Frank McIntyre, Explaining the Puzzle of CrossState Differences in Bankruptcy Rates, 52 J.L. & ECON. 367, 370 (2009).
94. In re Kasler, 611 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
95. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362.
96. Lefgren & McIntyre, supra note 93, at 371.
97. In re Zarnel, 619 F.3d 156, 171 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the automatic stay, once
bankruptcy proceedings commence, enables the fair distribution of the debtor’s assets to creditors).
98. Richard L. Stehl, Note, Eligibility for Damage Awards under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h): The
Second Circuit Answers the Riddle—When Does Congress Actually Mean What It Says?, 65 ST.
JOHNS L. REV. 1119, 1119–22 (1991).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (providing exemptions for certain assets). For a concise overview of
the role of exemption in Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy, see Alper, supra note 85, at 1916.
100. Congress recognized that exemptions and the discharge provide debtors a fresh start. See
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 125 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6086 (“The two most
important aspects of the fresh start available under the bankruptcy laws are the provision of
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assets are not subject to being included in the bankruptcy estate.101 The ability
to retain basic assets provides some measure of protection so that individuals
can provide for themselves and their families as they move on past
bankruptcy.102
While promoting a fresh start, Chapter 7 is also designed to provide a “fair
and equitable distribution to creditors.”103 A debtor must surrender non-exempt
assets104 to a trustee so that the assets can be liquidated,105 with the proceeds

adequate property for a return to a normal [life] and the discharge, with the release from creditor
collection attempts.”). Likewise, the Supreme Court has recognized the role of exemptions in
providing a fresh start. See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (“It is the twofold
purpose of the bankruptcy act...and then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions
and rights as the statute left untouched.”).
101. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-Enacted Bankruptcy
Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 363
(2014).
102. David G. Baker, First Circuit BAP Set to Interpret Schwab, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar.
2012, at 63 (“Historically, the purpose of exemption law has been to allow debtors to keep property
deemed essential to daily life. In the bankruptcy context, exemptions serve the overriding purpose
of helping the debtor obtain a fresh start by maintaining essential property necessary to build a new
life.”); Mark S. Zuckerberg & Amanda K. Quick, Exemptions – What Every Attorney Needs to
Know, RES GESTAE, July/August 2014, at 30 (“The purpose behind exemptions is two-fold.
Exemptions help individuals to protect at least part of their property while also preventing those in
financial trouble from becoming wards of the state.”); James Winston Kim, Comment, Saving Our
Future: Why Voluntary Contributions to Retirement Accounts are Reasonable Expenses, 26
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341, 362–63 (2010) (“The purpose of the exemptions is to provide the
debtor with the means to support themselves post-bankruptcy.”).
103. Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis, 17
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503, 505 (2009) (“Bankruptcy serves the interests of creditors by
providing them with an equitable distribution of the debtor’s nonexempt assets.”); Michael D.
Martinez, Note, Where There’s a “Will,” There Should be a Way: Why In re Salvino Unjustifiably
Restricts the Application of 532(a)(6) to Exclude Willful and Malicious Breaches of Contract, 29
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 447 (2009) (recognizing both the equitable distribution purpose and the
fresh start purpose of consumer bankruptcy); Carrie B. Williamson, Note, Missouri’s Section
287.865.5 Proof of Claim Filing Requirement: Are Injured Employees Getting a Fair Shake? 75
MO. L. REV. 271, 304 (2010); see also Gandy v. Gandy (In re Gandy), 299 F.3d 489, 498 (5th Cir.
2002) (“This dispute intimately implicates a central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code: the
expeditious and equitable distribution of the assets of Debtor’s estate.”); Sakowitz, Inc., v. Chase
Bank Int’l, 110 B.R. 268, 271 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) (noting the primary purpose of the Code is
to provide an equitable distribution of assets among creditors).
104. See Tedra Hobson, Note, The Bankruptcy Abuse Creation Act?: Curing Unintended
Consequences of Bankruptcy Reform, 40 GA. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (2006).
105. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2012) (establishing the duty of the trustee to collect and reduce
the property of the debtor’s estate to money).
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distributed to creditors pro rata 106 under a priority scheme in the Code. 107
Although a fundamental purpose of Chapter 7 is to provide a distribution of nonexempt assets to creditors, in most cases there are no significant non-exempt
assets to distribute.108 In fact, most consumer Chapter 7 cases are no-asset cases
in which there are no funds available to distribute to creditors.109
III. CORE VIRTUES OF CHAPTER 7 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
The two competing purposes of Chapter 7 are much more than abstract goals
or desired outcomes of Chapter 7. Together they are designed to serve the
interests of both debtors and creditors.110 The two purposes are a manifestation
of two core virtues that serve as the philosophical underpinning of Chapter 7
consumer bankruptcy—hope and fairness.111 Hope for debtors that they can
become productive members of society who are not burdened with debt, and
fairness for creditors in an equitable treatment in the bankruptcy case.112
A. Hope for Debtors
To understand the hope that Chapter 7 provides for debtors, we must first
define what is meant by hope in this context. Professors Kathryn Abrams and
Hila Keren provide a thoughtful definition and framework of hope in the context
of law that can be used in the consumer bankruptcy domain. 113 Professors
Abrams and Keren define hope in this way: “[H]ope takes as its object ‘a future
good that is arduous and difficult but nevertheless possible to obtain.’”114 This
106. See Alper, supra note 85, at 1915; see also Daniel A. Austin, Bankruptcy and the Myth of
“Uniform Law”, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081, 1092 (2012) (“The primary duty of the trustee is
to secure and sell the debtor’s non-exempt assets and to use the proceeds to pay claims of unsecured
creditors on a pro rata basis.”); Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for
Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 209 (1998) (“The trustee sells the assets and uses the
proceeds to pay creditors on a pro rata basis.”).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (providing the statutory scheme for distribution of assets among
creditors); see also Judy Gedge, Should Deficiency Judgments be Banned? Teaching Materials
Designed to Promote an Informed Student Debate, 19 J.L. BUS. & ETH. 65, 75 (2013) (“In a Chapter
7 bankruptcy, the debtor’s assets are sold by the bankruptcy trustee with the liquidation proceeds
distributed to the creditors in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code.”).
108. Hobson, supra note 104, at 1247.
109. Flynn, supra note 49, at 48; see also Dalie Jimenez, The Distribution of Assets in
Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 795, 797 (2009) (“This Article finds
that 93% of Chapter 7 individual debtors did not have any unencumbered non-exempt assets that
could be distributed to unsecured creditors.”).
110. Jimenez, supra note 109, at 795.
111. Id. at 795–96 (explaining that the system provides hope for the debtor by creating a fresh
start, and fairness to the creditor by promoting a more efficient manner in collecting debts).
112. Bankruptcy promotes other virtues as well, including the virtues of equity and justice.
Bruckner, supra note 2, at 256.
113. See generally Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 319 (2007).
114. Id. at 324.
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definition of hope is not an abstract feeling or concept, but it is aimed at a goal.115
That future goal is “arduous and difficult,” but still attainable.116
Hope for the consumer debtor burdened with debt is the future good of living
unburdened by debt and being a productive member of society.117 This goal is
not easy for most. Middle and lower income individuals face a host of financial
challenges and difficulties.118 To overcome these challenges and difficulties is
not impossible, but can be quite difficult.
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, through discharge and exemptions, provides a debtor
legal tools and a framework to have hope in the future.119 The legal relief can
make the future goal of living unburdened by consumer debt and being a
productive member of society reachable.120
B. Fairness to Creditors
To understand the fairness for creditors, we must first attempt to define what
is meant by fairness in the bankruptcy context. It is important to recognize at
the outset that “fairness” is an elusive concept in the law.121 Even so, at its core,
the basic definition of fairness is to “treat people in a way that does not favor
some over others.”122 This basic notion of fairness has its roots in Deontology,
where “[m]embers of society in the same position should be treated equally.”123
In the context of bankruptcy law, bankruptcy courts should treat similar
situations in the same way.124 From a creditor perspective, this would entail
similar creditors being treated the same in a bankruptcy case. Fairness is
achieved—i.e., similar treatment for creditors—in bankruptcy by providing
creditors the opportunity to share in a distribution of assets on a pro rata basis as
set forth in the Code.125 The Code provides that “similarly situated creditors

115. Id. at 325.
116. Id.
117. See Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial
Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 515–16 (1991).
118. See MILES RAPOPORT & JENNIFER WHEARY, DĒMOS, RUNNING IN PLACE: WHERE THE
MIDDLE CLASS AND THE POOR MEET 1 (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/
publications/RunningInPlace_0.pdf (addressing the economic and environmental factors affecting
both the poor and middle classes, including lack of social mobility, the rise of low-wage jobs, and
unexpected medical costs).
119. See supra Part II.
120. See Efrat, supra note 92, at 141.
121. Austin, supra note 106, at 1138.
122. Fairness, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
fairness (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
123. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 653 (2001).
124. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 106, at 1138–39 (noting concerns of unfairness when the
geographic location causes different outcomes for similar situations).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)–(b) (2012) (detailing the order that claims are to be paid and requiring
that payments be made on a pro rata basis).
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receive equal distributions from the estate.” 126 It is fundamental bankruptcy
policy to ensure that there is an equitable distribution among creditors.127
IV. HOPE AND FAIRNESS IN THE POST-REFORM ACT ERA
When Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy functions in a way that promotes
outcomes reflecting both the virtues of hope and fairness, the consumer
bankruptcy legal system is achieving its purposes of “protect[ing] people,
provid[ing] services, and achiev[ing] justice.”128 Achieving these purposes is
the primary virtue of any legal system. However, Chapter 7 consumer
bankruptcy cannot achieve this primary virtue without promoting hope and
fairness.
A. Diminishing Hope
During the decade since the Reform Act, hope has diminished for individual
debtors, primarily due to a decline in access to Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy
relief.129 Two primary issues have impacted access to relief: (1) it costs more to
file for Chapter 7 relief, 130 and (2) there are artificial statutory hurdles to
qualifying for relief. 131 Both of these issues are related and greatly impact
access.
1. Increased Costs to File
Scholars and attorneys agree that the costs to file Chapter 7 have greatly
increased since the Reform Act.132 Attorney fees in Chapter 7 asset cases have
increased 30% since the Reform Act.133 Attorney fees in Chapter 7 no-asset
cases have increased 48% since the Reform Act.134

126. Bruckner, supra note 2, at 256.
127. Koch Ref. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1344 (7th Cir. 1987).
128. Rubin, supra note 4, at 881.
129. See generally Robert J. Landry, III & David Read, Erosion of Access to Consumer
Bankruptcy’s “Fresh Start” Policy in the United States: Statutory Reforms Needed to Enhance
Access to Justice, 7 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 51, 52 (2015) (providing a comprehensive treatment
of the access to Chapter 7 relief in light of the Reform Act).
130. See generally Carlson, supra note 40, at 227–28. Professor Carlson argues that the means
test has led to higher costs for consumer debtors with no clear benefit in two respects: 1) decreasing
abuse of the bankruptcy system, or 2) increasing the return to creditors. Id.
131. See infra notes 142–49 and accompanying text.
132. Lupica, supra note 53, at 30–32 (summarizing the findings of a sample study of Chapter
7 and Chapter 13 case filings, which reveal increased administrative and attorney costs regarding
Chapter 7 filings).
133. Id. at 69 (showing that attorney fees have increased from $821 to $1,072).
134. Id.
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Filing fees that are payable to the bankruptcy court 135 have also increased
since the Reform Act.136 Immediately prior to the Reform Act the filing fee was
$209, and with enactment of the Reform Act it increased to $274.137 The current
filing fee is now $335.138 When the attorney fee and filing fee increase, along
with other required direct access costs,139 the direct access cost to filing Chapter
7 no-asset cases has risen 51% since the Reform Act.140 The direct access cost
to filing Chapter 7 asset cases has risen 37%.141
2. Artificial Hurdles
The statutory means test is complex and riddled with procedural problems.142
To date, there has not been any showing that the means test has actually
improved the consumer bankruptcy system or achieved its purposes of reducing
abuse and shifting debtors from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13. 143 Also, the
requirement of credit counseling prior to filing has been widely discredited.144
It is effectively an empty requirement with no clear benefit.145 It adds not only
a procedural hurdle, but also an additional cost to already cash-strapped
individuals.146
Likewise, debtor education requirements do not seem clearly beneficial.147
Although the idea of debtor education to help individuals going forward seems
positive, and if implemented in a serious fashion would enhance debtors in the
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2012) (providing the statutory framework for the filing schedule when
filing in bankruptcy).
136. Lupica, supra note 53, at 68.
137. Id.
138. Schedule of Fees, U.S. BANKR. CT. N.D. OF ALA., http://www.alnb.uscourts.gov/
schedule-fees (effective Dec. 1, 2014).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 143–47 (discussing credit counseling and debtor
education requirements and associated fees).
140. Lupica, supra note 53, at 68 (the total direct access costs have increased from $868 to
$1,309).
141. Id. at 68–69 (noting further that the mean for attorneys fees, which are included in the
total direct access costs, has increased from $821 to $1,072).
142. Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 281
(2005) (noting that aspects of the means test are “complicated and arbitrary” and likely to generate
litigation).
143. See, e.g., Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the
Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 668 (2005) (“The means test is far
from perfect. It adds complexity and costs to all cases, and may deter or dismiss relatively few
would-be chapter 7 debtors.”).
144. Katherine A. Jeter-Boldt, Good in Theory, Bad in Practice: The Unintended
Consequences of BAPCPA’s Credit Counseling Requirement, 71 MO. L. REV. 1101, 1110–12
(2006) (highlighting judicial criticism of the credit counseling requirement).
145. See Michael D. Sousa, Just Punch My Bankruptcy Ticket: A Qualitative Study of
Mandatory Financial Education, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 391, 416 (2013) (noting that credit counseling
“serves no useful function” and providing empirical support for this vantage point).
146. Id. at 411.
147. Id. at 429.
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future, 148 education requirements as currently implemented are largely a
perfunctory procedure to obtain the discharge.149
B. Diminished Fairness
Fairness in terms of equitable treatment among creditors does not appear to
be diminished. The Code has maintained its distribution scheme requiring pro
rata distribution of assets among creditors.150 However, fairness can be viewed
and considered in several ways beyond equitable treatment of similarly situated
creditors.
1. Have Chapter 13 Filings Increased and Chapter 7 Filings Decreased?
The Reform Act was designed to increase fairness by shifting debtors from
Chapter 7 to Chapter 13.151 The premise is that creditors would receive more in
a Chapter 13 filing through a repayment plan. 152 If this occurred, it would
enhance the fairness of the consumer bankruptcy system.153 However, data does
not suggest that this has occurred. One of the few empirical models testing the
impact of the Reform Act on filing rates clearly shows that Chapter 13 filings
are stable and have stayed close to what they would have been without the
Reform Act. 154 Therefore, any increase in overall filings is not based on
increases in Chapter 13 filings, but an increase in Chapter 7 filings.155
Figure 2 sets forth the yearly filings for consumer Chapter 7 and consumer
Chapter 13. Despite the one-time large drop in Chapter 7 filings in 2006, they
trended up from 2007 to 2010, reaching over 1.1 million filings. Since 2010
they have trended down each year, reaching 600,885 in 2014.
Chapter 13 filings have followed the same general trend as consumer Chapter
7 filings. After the Reform Act, there was a drop to 248,430 filings. From 2007
to 2010 the filings trended up each year reaching 434,739 in 2010. Since 2010
they have dropped each year, down to 307,783 in 2014.

148. Id. at 416 (noting that the debtor education requirement is good in theory).
149. Id. at 429 (“This bounded study serves to re-emphasize most commentators’ thoughts and
empirical conclusions with respect to the BAPCPA debtor education courses, namely, that as
currently constituted they fail to provide any meaningful benefit to the overwhelming number of
debtors that file for bankruptcy protection each and every year.”).
150. See Lupica, supra note 53, at 69 (explaining that fees have increased from $654 to $968).
151. Christian E. Weller, et al., Estimating the Effect of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on the Bankruptcy Rate, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 347 (2010).
152. Id. at 330 (explaining that in Chapter 13 filings, debtors must commit to a repayment plan
that typically spans five years).
153. Id. at 330 (noting that the repayment plan benefits creditors by ensuring debts are repaid
and lowering the incidence of “bankruptcies of convenience”).
154. Id. at 347.
155. Id. at 347–48.
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156

Beyond examining the raw filing numbers and trends of Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13, the composition of filings can shed light on the impact of the Reform
Act in terms of fairness from a creditor vantage point. Table 1 shows that since
enactment of the Code, Chapter 7 accounts for 69.76% of all consumer filings.
Prior to the enactment of the Reform Act, from 1980 to 2004, Chapter 7
accounted for 71.3% of all consumer filings. Since the enactment of the Reform
Act, from 2006 to 2014, Chapter 7 accounts for 66.99% of all consumer flings.
We tested for significance by conducting an analysis of variance using Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (“SPSS”) version 22. We found the difference
to be statistically significant at the .001 level based on an F value of
12.992. Therefore, we observed a significantly lower percentage of Chapter 7
filings after the legislation took effect.157

156. This table is derived from a data set compiled by the author based on data published by
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See Caseload Statistics Data Tables,
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/case
load-statistics-data-tables?tn=&pn=32&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%5Bvalue
%5D%5Byear%5D= (last visited July 20, 2016).
157. See supra Section IV.B.1. (including Fig. 2). Further empirical analysis should be
conducted, as the significantly lower percentage of Chapter 7 filings may be overstated due to the
onset of Chapter 7 in 2005.
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2. Actual Return to Creditors in Chapter 7
Beyond no dramatic shift from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 filings, if we consider
the actual return of distributions to creditors over time under Chapter 7, we see
a reduced return of assets to unsecured creditors in recent years. From 1996 to
2000, unsecured creditors received 32.3% of assets distributed in Chapter 7;
from 2006 to 2011, unsecured creditors received 31.2% of assets distributed in
Chapter 7.158 Interestingly, during these two periods the distributions increased
for secured creditors, trustees’ fees, and attorneys’ fees.159
Distributions as a percentage of claims in Chapter 7 cases have also decreased
since the Reform Act. Prior to the Reform Act, distributions to unsecured
claimholders accounted for 10.4%. 160 After the Reform Act, distributions
decreased to 5.1%.161
3. Actual Return to Creditors in Chapter 13
Interestingly, although the Chapter 13 filing rate has been relatively steady,
the actual return to unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 cases has declined since
the Reform Act.162 Prior to the Reform Act, the return to unsecured creditors in
Chapter 13 was 29.5%, whereas in the Post-Reform Act Era it decreased to
26.4%.163
4. Continued Lack of Fairness Based on Geography
Lack of fairness in terms of equitable treatment based on geography continues
under the Reform Act. The inconsistency of exemptions offered from state to
state leads to variation in terms of the percentage of asset cases.164 Some states,
158. Flynn, supra note 49, at 49 tbls. 3 & 4.
159. Id. (showing that the distributions from assets for secured creditors increased from 29.1%
to 32.4%, for trustees’ fees from 4.4% to 6.3%, and for attorneys’ fees from 11.7% to 13.1%).
160. Lupica, supra note 53, at 85.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 84.
163. Id.
164. Flynn, supra note 49, at 49.
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such as Georgia and Rhode Island, have asset cases under 2%, whereas other
states, such as Montana and Kansas, have asset cases in excess of 30%. 165
Furthermore, varying state level exemptions have led to disparate results for
creditors solely because of the debtor’s state of residence.166 This inequity, or
lack of fairness, has no justification in bankruptcy policy.167 Thus, the Reform
Act exacerbates the lack of fairness in treatment of creditors based solely on
geographical boundaries.168
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the constant claims of abuse of Chapter 7 filings by consumers, there
has not been an empirical showing that this perceived abuse occurred prior to
the Reform Act or thereafter. In fact, there has been little indication that the
bankruptcy system has been improved or enhanced by the Reform Act. Rather,
anecdotal evidence indicates that the core virtues that form the philosophical
foundation of consumer Chapter 7 are not promoted, and are perhaps actually
diminished, by the Reform Act. Policymakers should return to the drawing
board and refocus consumer bankruptcy reform in a way that actually promotes
the key virtues of hope for debtors and fairness for creditors: By finding a
solution that balances the natural tension between these two important virtues.

165. Id.
166. See generally Ponoroff, supra note 6, at 409 (discussing the interplay of federal
bankruptcy law and state-level exemptions).
167. See, e.g., Ponoroff, supra note 6, at 361, 409 (noting the lack of equity and equality with
the disparate treatment of creditors based on the particular applicable state law exemption).
168. Professor Ponoroff summarized the Reform Act’s treatment of exemptions as follows:
[The Reform Act] characteristically ignored the issue of minimally sufficient exemptions
for debtors residing in opt-out states with miserly exemptions, and, in its uniquely
inelegant style, established an elaborate, confusing, and dreadfully convoluted scheme
for attempting to control the practice of abusing high dollar or unlimited state exemptions
through forum-shopping and the excessive conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt
form on the eve of bankruptcy.
Ponoroff, supra note 6, at 359 (internal citations omitted).
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